‘DEAL OF THE CENTURY’ WILL SET NEW BASELINE FOR MIDEAST DIPLOMACY
The Trump peace plan may be less about reaching a final settlement now, and more about setting down new parameters for a changed reality.
BY HERB KEINON. APRIL 25, 2019. Jerusalem Post.
In a twist
to the “after-the-hagim [holidays]” line ubiquitous here around Passover and
Rosh Hashanah, Jared Kushner – US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and
senior adviser – said Tuesday that the long-awaited Trump peace blueprint will
be rolled out “after Ramadan.”
“We were getting ready [to roll out the plan] at the end of last year, and then
they called for Israeli elections,” Kushner said at the 2019 TIME 100 Summit
trumpeting the magazine’s selection last week of the 100 most influential
people in the world. “Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu had a great victory,
and he’s in the middle of forming his coalition. Once that’s done, we’ll
probably be in the middle of Ramadan. So we’ll wait until after Ramadan and
then we’ll put our plan out.”
Or not.
This is not the first time the “after Ramadan” timetable has been used by this
administration in reference to when it will present its “deal of the century.”
In the beginning of 2018, reports emerged that the plan would be released in
the spring; in the spring the reports were that it would be released after
Ramadan in June; after Ramadan the speculation was that it would be released in
early fall. By then, however, people speculated – correctly, as it turned out –
that it would not be released before the US midterm elections on November 6, so
as not to do anything to alienate Trump’s strongly pro-Israel Evangelical base.
In September, Trump said that he would be releasing the plan in two to four
months. But then the new Israeli elections were called in December, and it
became clear that the plan would not be issued during the campaign, so as not
to complicate matters for Netanyahu.
If Netanyahu now needs all 42 days at his disposal to form a government, that
period will end on May 29. Ramadan is expected to begin this year on May 7, and
end on June 4. Which means that on June 5 the moon and stars will be aligned
just right for the rollout of the plan.
Realistically,
there will then be about a three-month window for the plan to be presented,
until America’s Labor Day, September 2, when the US presidential
election campaign will shift into high gear before the primaries in the first
six months of 2020. And during that campaign, Trump will again be averse to
doing anything that might alienate his strongly pro-Israel Evangelical base.
Kushner sounded resolute Tuesday about presenting the plan, but so did Trump
himself last September, only to be overtaken by events. New reasons may be
found after Ramadan to postpone its presentation as well.
For instance, perhaps Netanyahu, saddled with a hard-right government that he
knows will not support some of the concessions that Israel will inevitably be
asked to make under the plan, may ask Trump not to unveil it, so as not to
endanger his government.
Or perhaps Trump will listen to some voices being raised in Washington
entreating him not to present a plan that has no chance of succeeding –
primarily because the Palestinians have already rejected it, sight unseen –
since to do so would only make a bad situation worse.
One of the more prominent voices in this school of thought is that of Robert
Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Two weeks ago, he wrote a piece on the Foreign Policy magazine’s website
calling on Trump not to present his plan, saying it faced sure rejection and as
a result would set back US interests in three critical areas: “It might lead to
annexation of the West Bank; it could give the Saudi government leverage over
the United States that it doesn’t currently have; and it would distract from
Trump’s signature achievement of putting real pressure on Iran’s government.”
According to Satloff’s logic, the current Israeli-Palestinian status quo is far
from perfect, but it has led to a “reasonably well-functioning governing
entity” in the West Bank, keeping it from becoming a “platform for rocket and
terrorist attacks against Israel.”
This status quo would come tumbling down, he warned, if Abbas rejects the plan
– as he has said he would. “In turn, Israeli rightists will seize on Abbas’s
‘no’ to argue that Israel has no negotiating partner, gutting a key rationale
for keeping the status quo alive.”
In
addition, he argued, the plan will need major Saudi backing to succeed, giving
the Saudis dangerous leverage over US policy, and it would also “distract from
the president’s signature achievement in the Middle East: the unexpectedly
effective impact of the so-called maximum pressure campaign on Iran.”
ON TUESDAY, however, Kushner did not sound like someone who was going to
jettison a plan he has been working on for two years. While revealing nothing
of the blueprint’s details – including whether it would advocate a two-state
solution – he did say that the Trump peace team is trying a different approach.
“We’ve tried to do it a little bit differently,” Kushner said. “Normally, they
[Mideast mediators] start with a process and then hope that the process leads
to a resolution for something to happen. What we’ve done is the opposite. We’ve
done very extensive research and a lot of talking to a lot of people. We’re not
trying to impose our will. I think the document that you will see, which is a
very detailed proposal, is something we created by engaging a lot of people in
the region, and people who have worked on this in the past.
“I hope it is a very comprehensive vision for what can be, if people are
willing to make some hard decisions. So what we’ve done is we started with a
proposed solution, and then we will work on a process to try to get there.”
In other
words, instead of getting a negotiating process rolling that the organizers
hope will then lead the sides to come to some kind of an agreement, the Trump
administration is working backward: present a comprehensive solution first, and
then figure out how to get there.
There are various reasons, diplomatic officials have explained, for this
approach, one of which is the realization that the Trump administration – which
Netanyahu has said is the most supportive administration Israel has ever worked
with – will not be there forever, and that it could indeed be turned out of
office in November 2020.
That being the case, the administration has some 20 months in which it can put
down new markers on Middle East issues and set new parameters.
There is a sense that the political pendulum in the US swings drastically from
one extreme to the next – from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, and then from
Obama to Trump – and that it could next swing to Elizabeth Warren, Bernie
Sanders or Beto O’Rourke.
As such, one of the aims of the plan – which even the most optimistic in the
Trump peace team must realize has a slim chance of success, considering the
numerous forces already lining up against it, including the PA, some European
countries and the EU foreign policy bureaucracy in Brussels – is perhaps less
about reaching a final settlement now, and more about setting down a new set of
facts: new parameters.
This administration, which in addition to Trump includes strong pro-Israel
voices such as those of Vice President Mike Pence, US Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton, does not want to leave
Washington with the last American statement on the Middle East being Obama’s
decision in the waning days of his term in 2016 not to veto an anti-settlement
resolution in the UN Security Council, thereby placing the bulk of the onus for
the stalemated peace process on Israel.
The administration also does not want the final word on the matter to be the
Clinton Parameters of 2000 – guidelines for a permanent-status agreement based
on a Palestinian state on 94%-96% of the territories and with Jerusalem as the
capital of two states.
Much has changed since then – the Second Intifada and the Gaza withdrawal have
changed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the “Arab Spring” has
fundamentally changed the Middle East – and it is expected that the Trump
plan will reflect those changes, something that could set the narrative for the
next decade, just as the Clinton Parameters have dominated the conversation
on peacemaking since 2000.
The
plan, whose details have remained a closely guarded secret, is expected to be
based around a set of principles: significantly improving Palestinian lives;
safeguarding Israeli security; Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, though the
borders there may be negotiable; not uprooting anyone from anywhere, including
Jews in the settlements; a new definition of refugees; and some kind of
Palestinian state, though likely to be along the lines of Netanyahu’s idea of a
state-minus.
Animating the discussion on Israel inside the administration since Trump took
power in 2017 is the sense that Israel is America’s most important ally in the Middle
East, and that – as such – Washington does not want to weaken it in any way. A
call to uproot settlements, which would lead to significant domestic strife, is
seen by some in the administration as a move that could significantly weaken
Israel, and as such something that should be avoided.
Likewise, the US does not want to weaken Jordan – another key Mideast ally –
and as such does not want to set up a possible failed state in the West Bank
that could threaten the Hashemite Kingdom. With enough problems already on its
northern border with Syria and on its eastern border with Iraq, the last thing Jordan
needs is a failed state on its western frontier.
The administration, which has devoted a lot of time and man hours to the plan,
obviously hopes that it will be accepted – when it is eventually presented.
Kushner, during his comments on Tuesday, said that when the sides look at the
proposal, “I am hopeful that what they’ll do is to say, ‘Look, there are some
compromises here, but at the end of the day this is really a framework that can
allow us to make our lives all materially better.’ And we’ll see if the
leadership on both sides has the courage to take the lead to try to go
forward.”
And, if not, at least a new marker will have been set.
Even some sharp critics of Trump’s foreign policy, such as Richard Haas, a
former US diplomat who is now the president of the Council on Foreign
Relations, acknowledge that the time has come to look at the Middle East
differently.
In a piece this week in Project Syndicate where he said that there is little
chance that the Trump plan would succeed, he nevertheless concluded that: “It
is time for a paradigm shift in how we think about the Middle East, not because
a better diplomatic model has presented itself (it has not), but because the
current paradigm is increasingly at odds with reality.”